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In the near future the United States may witness the second con-
stitutional convention in its history. Prior to the passage of the Gramm-
Rudman budget-balancing bill in December 1985,1 thirty-two states
had requested Congress to call a convention to consider a balanced
budget amendment to the Constitution.' If the Supreme Court upholds
a district court's recent decision that Gramm-Rudman is unconstitu-
tional, 8 the convention drive may be rekindled.4 Only two more states
need to submit requests before Congress will be required under article
V to call a constitutional convention.5
t B.A. 1983, Haverford College; J.D. Candidate 1986, University of
Pennsylvania.
I The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No.
99-177, 99 Stat. 1038, commonly known as "Gramm-Rudman," calls for reducing the
federal deficit, in annual steps, to zero by 1991. See Congress Adopts Stopgap Measure
on U.S. Spending, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1985, at Al, col. 1. If in any given year,
Congress fails to meet the budgetary goals of Gramm-Rudman, the legislation requires
the Comptroller General to order automatic reductions in appropriations. See Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177,
§§ 251(b)(1), 253, 99 Stat. 1038, 1068, 1078 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 901, 903);
see also Lawmakers Challenge Scope of Budget Measure, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1985,
at B9, col. 3.
2 See Constitutional Parley is Two States Away, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 10, 1983, at 28,
col. 1.
The district court held that the law unconstitutionally vests the executive power
in the Comptroller General. Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C. 1986).
The Supreme Court is expected to render a decision by July of this year. See Judges
Fault Key Part of Deficit Law, Philadelphia Inquirer, Feb. 6, 1986, at Al, col. 1.
" Even if the constitutionality of Gramm-Rudman is upheld, the impetus to call
for a balanced budget through constitutional amendment may not wane. A constitu-
tional amendment obviously has more lasting impact than a legislative act.
The present convention drive began after Congress failed to propose a balanced
budget amendment. See Constitutional Parley is Two States Away, supra note 2, at col.
1. In the spring of 1983, Missouri became the thirty-second state to submit a petition.
See id. at col. 2. The final push for a convention was underway when Gramm-Rudman
was passed, although it had not met with much success. California and Montana re-
cently attempted to hold popular referendums to request such a convention, but these
referendums were declared unconstitutional by the state supreme courts. See AFL-CIO
v. Eu, 36 Cal. 3d 684, 687, 686 P.2d 609, 613, 206 Cal. Rptr. 89, 93 (1984); Montana
ex rel. Harper v. Waltermire, 691 P.2d 826, 828-29 (Mont. 1984), application for stay
denied sub nom. Uhler v. AFL-CIO, 105 S. Ct. 5 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1984).
1 See U.S. CoNsT. art. V (directing Congress to call for a constitutional conven-
tion if two-thirds of the state legislatures request one).
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The possibility of a convention is not here merely for the mo-
ment-it is here to stay. Convention requests have already been filed on
a variety of issues;6 this is the second time in the past twenty years that
Congress has almost been forced to call a constitutional convention.
Unfortunately, the process of amendment via a constitutional conven-
tion has never been thoroughly worked out.' No one need elaborate on
what may happen if Congress calls a convention while the convention
process remains undefined; one need only reflect on the impact of the
last convention on the Articles of Confederation to gain a sense of the
magnitude of change that might occur.
The application of state legislatures for a constitutional convention
raises a number of perplexing constitutional problems:9 whether both
houses of each state legislature must take part in the convention call;
whether a state's application may lapse; whether an application must
be specific or general; whether state referendums in favor of convention
requests are valid; whether a state may rescind its application.' 0 Dele-
gate selection raises another host of problems: who is eligible to be a
candidate; who may elect the delegates; how the delegates may vote in
the convention; whether states can recall their delegates." The proce-
dures that may be adopted by a convention are also open to debate."2
Before these issues can be addressed, however, questions of institu-
6 Convention petitions have been filed on the following issues: direct election of
senators, limitations on federal taxing power, prohibition of polygamy, general revision
of the Constitution, repeal of the eighteenth amendment, presidential tenure, treaty
making, imposition of a gasoline tax, abortion, and busing. See Constitutional Parley is
Two States Away, supra note 2, at col. 3; AMERICAN ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POuC
RESEARCH, SPECIAL ANALYSIS No. 5, A CONVENTION TO AMEND THE CONSTITu-
TION? (1967) (analyzing questions that would arise in the context of an article V
convention).
' Prior to 1963, at least 206 petitions requesting constitutional conventions were
received by Congress. See AMERICAN ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH,
supra note 6, at 5. The Supreme Court's decision in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964), holding that the fourteenth amendment requires that state legislatures be ap-
portioned according to the "one man, one vote" rule, resulted in a convention drive by
the states to propose an amendment nullifying the decision. See AMERICAN ENTER.
INST. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH, supra note 6, at 10. By 1968, 33 states had sub-
mitted applications to Congress requesting a convention. See Constitutional Parley is
Two States Away, supra note 2, at col 3.
8 See Tribe, Issues Raised by Requesting Congress to Call a Constitutional Con-
vention to Propose a Balanced Budget Amendment, 10 PAC. L.J. 627, 632-35 (1979).
The process is undefined because the matter has never been presented for authoritative
resolution: the states have never amassed the two-thirds support required for calling a
convention.
Lawrence Tribe has provided a long list of the questions that would be raised by
the calling of a convention. See id. at 638-40.
10 See id. at 638.
11 See id. at 638-39.
' See id. at 639-40.
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tional power must be answered. There is as little consensus on who
should resolve convention issues as there is on how they should be re-
solved."' Massive institutional conflict may result from attempts to re-
solve the issue of who has the power to decide. The potential disputes
among the branches of government over which branch has the power to
decide the substantive questions threaten to undermine the legitimacy of
our constitutional scheme.
This Comment answers the initial question raised by the conven-
tion process-who has the power to decide. The Comment argues that
the Constitution allocates the power to decide issues arising from a con-
stitutional convention to the states, subject to review by the Supreme
Court. A resolution of all of the substantive issues raised by a constitu-
tional convention is well beyond the scope of this Comment. But the
Comment will attempt to show that the principles used to argue that
article V allocates power over constitutional conventions to the states
also suggest how the Supreme Court should approach review of article
V activity.
Some theory of constitutional interpretation is necessarily involved
in arguing about who should decide convention issues and in suggesting
how such issues should be approached. This Comment adopts the the-
ory developed by John Hart Ely in Democracy and Distrust,4 a theory
that is based on the Constitution, on our understanding of the source of
the Constitution's power, and on our understanding of its promise.
This Comment answers the question of who should decide convention
issues and how they should be approached by looking to Ely's under-
standing of the Constitution for guidance.
1S Tribe himself comments that these questions are unanswerable and unknow-
able. See id. at 638-40; see also Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change:
Rethinking the Amendment Process, 97 HARV. L. REV. 386 (1983) (challenging the
widely held view that Congress should decide convention issues).
"I J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusT: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980). In his book, Ely propounds what is easily the most influential theory of consti-
tutional interpretation and judicial review in recent years. See, e.g., Alexander, Modern
Equal Protection Theories: A Metatheoretical Taxonomy and Critique, 42 OHIO ST.
L.J. 3, 3 (1981) ("Ely's much and deservedly heralded book . . . deals with perennial
constitutional questions quite brilliantly, marking it as perhaps the most important the-
oretical work among the recent ones."); Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 Omo ST.
L.J. 131, 131 (1981) (Ely's book "culminates a tradition of scholarly attempts to estab-
lish modes of judicial review . . . ."); Clark, A New Theory of Judicial Review, 11
CAP. U.L. REv. 33, 54 (1981) (Ely's book is "stimulating . . . manifesting exceptional
perception, thoughtfulness, and insight."); Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-
Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1064 (1980) (Ely's book is "the
most recent and lucid argument for a process-perfecting view of constitutional
law . . ... "). For an overview of critical responses to Ely's theory, see Constitutional
Adjudication and Democratic Theory, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 259 (1981);Judicial Review
versus Democracy, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 1 (1981).
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Part I of the Comment examines Ely's premises concerning the
source of the Constitution's meaning and the substance of its promise.
Employing these premises in analyzing article V, Part II argues that
article V allocates control over constitutional conventions to the states
and that this allocation of power flows from the Constitution's commit-
ment to representative democracy. The Comment then contends that
courts should review states' article V activities to protect the individ-
ual's right of representation inherent in our constitutional scheme, a
protection made explicit by the fourteenth amendment. By subjecting
constitutional conventions to the standards of the fourteenth amend-
ment, the Court can implement the procedural participatory values that
underlie our system of representative democracy. The Comment con-
cludes with an examination of one potential bar to judicial review, the
political question doctrine, and a brief look at the suggested mode of
judicial review in order to move toward resolution of issues in an area
in which the questions seem initially-in the words of Professor
Tribe-"unanswerable."1
I. ELY'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONSTITUTION
Ely recognizes that provisions in the Constitution may be regarded
as falling along a continuum "ranging from the relatively specific to the
extremely open-textured."u6 The meaning of specific constitutional pro-
visions is clear from the words of the document itself.17 For example,
the Constitution's requirement that the President be thirty-five years
old is not seriously open to interpretive debate. On the other hand,
open-ended provisions, such as the fourteenth amendment, invite inter-
preters to look beyond the four corners of the document when filling in
their meaning."'
Ely suggests one way of filling in the broad prescriptions of the
Constitution: the Court should interpret the open-ended provisions of
the Constitution to fulfill its promise of representative democracy.19 At
a minimum, this requires the Court to keep clear the channels of politi-
cal change by ensuring that avenues of participation within the political
15 See Tribe, supra note 8, at 638.
16 J. ELY, supra note 14, at 13.
127 See id.
1 See id. at 13-14. Ely argues that many provisions in the Constitution are broad
invitations to make constitutional considerations that can not be found in the language
of the amendment or the intent of the ratifiers. The restrained, "clause-bound" inter-
pretivism of Justice Black fails, according to Ely, to take into account the fact that the
Constitution contains open-ended provisions demanding references to sources beyond
the document itself. See id. at 11-41.
11 See id. at 87-88.
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process remain free and open,20 and to facilitate the process of repre-
sentation of minorities by ensuring that representatives live up to their
duty to represent all their constituents fairly.
21
Ely's approach to the Constitution and his theory of judicial re-
view flow from his view of the document's source of power and its
purpose:
We have as a society from the beginning, and now almost
instinctively, accepted the notion that a representative de-
mocracy must be our form of government. The very process
of adopting the Constitution was designed to be, and in some
respects it was, more democratic than any that had preceded
it. . . . The Constitution . . . was submitted for ratification
to "the people themselves" . . . . The document itself . . .
expresses its clear commitment to a system of representative
democracy at both the federal and state levels.
22
For Ely, these'observations mandate a particular approach to dis-
covering the meaning of the Constitution. First, one must focus on the
ratifiers' intent to unlock the meaning of the Constitution.28 Second, the
20 See id. at 105-34. Ely contends that, at a minimum, each citizen is guaranteed
both a voice and a vote in the political process. He views the strict scrutiny that the
Court has applied in voter certification and malapportionment cases as explicit recogni-
tion of the need to keep the political process open to all citizens. See id. at 120-21
(discussing Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Carrington v.
Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)). The Court's pro-
tection of a free and open process, according to Ely, extends beyond explicit representa-
tional interests such as voting. The first amendment rights recognized by the Court,
including those not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, such as political associa-
tion rights, are best understood by a theory that these rights are "critical to the func-
tioning of an open and effective democratic process." Id. at 105.
21 See id. at 135-79. Ely argues that the representational underpinnings of the
Constitution demand judicial scrutiny of the distribution of legislatively created benefits
as well as issues involving "a voice [or] a vote." See id. at 135-36, 145. To support this
contention, he focuses on the government's procedure for distributing the benefits rather
than on the identity of those benefits that are or should be protected. Consistent with
his adoption of the ideal of "virtual representation," his touchstone for judicial review
of benefit distribution schemes is the motivation of the legislators. Review of legislative
procedure is appropriate even where there is a claim that a "constitutionally gratui-
tous" benefit-one "not essential to political participation or explicitly guaranteed by
the language of the Constitution," id. at 136-has been improperly withheld. See id. at
145. Acknowledging that the Court has flip-flopped on the relevance of motivational
analysis, see id. at 136-45, Ely argues that such analysis should be and, in fact, has
been an appropriate part of judicial review of government actions. See id. at 145.
22 Id. at 5 (citations omitted).
2, Ely states that
[slomething that wasn't ratified can't be part of our Constitution, and
sometimes in order to know what was ratified we need to know what was
intended. (Unless we know . . . [what the ratifiers intended], we don't
know what the ratifiers thought they were ratifying and thus what we
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initial place to look for the ratifiers' intent is in the words of the
Constitution.2 4
Ely relies on his understanding of the Constitution's purpose and
his method for discerning constitutional meaning to develop a theory for
the Supreme Court's role in interpreting open-ended constitutional pro-
visions whose meaning cannot be supplied solely by reliance on their
language. According to Ely, the nature of the Constitution, the sub-
stance of the document's promise, is a form of representative democracy
characterized by "procedural fairness in the resolution of individual
disputes . . ., and . . . broad participation in the processes and distri-
butions of government. ' 25 The Supreme Court should, therefore, inter-
pret the open-ended provisions of the Constitution in ways that give
effect to these procedural, participatory values inherent in the ratifiers'
overall understanding of the Constitution.26
Ely identifies two components of the Constitution's vision of a rep-
resentative democracy: broad participation in the political process and
protection of discrete minorities. 7 He argues that these two features
are part of a vision of representative government that has been at the
core of our Constitution from the beginning-that of "virtual represen-
tation."12 8 "Virtual representation" was understood by the founders as
the duty of representatives to govern in the interest of the whole peo-
ple.29 This duty, while it does not command equal treatment for all,
precludes representatives refusing to represent any particular group.30
The Constitution as a whole must then be understood in terms of
the ratifiers' desire to implement a system of representative democ-
racy. 1 In Ely's view, the fourteenth amendment makes explicit this
promise of representation rooted in our constitutional system.3 2 By en-
suring access to the political process and protecting minority interests
under the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court furthers the ideal
of virtual representation.
should recognize as the constitutional command.) To frame the issue thus,
however, is to bring to the fore what seems invariably to get lost in excur-
sions into the intent of the framers, namely that the most important datum
bearing on what was intended is the constitutional language itself
Id. at 16.
24 See id.
25 Id. at 87 (citations omitted).
28 See id. at 88.
27 See id. at 74.
28 Id. at 82.
29 See id. at 83-84.
30 See id. at 82.
21 See id. at 88-101.
32 See id. at 98.
[Vol. 134:939
SCOUTING ARTICLE FIVE
The Supreme Court should not, however, interpret the fourteenth
amendment and other open-ended clauses in ways that enforce any val-
ues other than those of participation and representation. Ely argues
that the enforcement of procedural and participatory values are all that
are promised by the Constitution, and thus, all that a court can enforce
while remaining consistent with the Constitution's vision of representa-
tive democracy. 33
That substantive issues arise in considering the values of participa-
tion and process does not defeat Ely's desire to avoid judicial review of
"the substantive merits of the political choice under attack."" Ely ad-
mits that his view of the Constitution requires judges to impose sub-
stantive values of a particular kind:
Participation itself can obviously be regarded as a
value ....
If the objection is . . that one might well "value" cer-
tain decision procedures for their own sake, of course it is
right: one might. And to one who insisted on that terminol-
ogy, my point would be that the "values" the Court should
pursue are "participational values" of the sort I have
mentioned . . .
Ely thus recognizes that implementing such values involves the Court
in substantive value judgments. The important point is that these sub-
stantive value judgments take place exclusively within the context of
procedural and participatory questions.
Those criticizing the logic of Ely's theory attempt, at bottom, to
question the distinction between the values of participation and process
on the one hand, and "substantive values" on the other. 6 They claim
33 According to Ely, at the core of the Constitution is a concern with ensuring
broad participation in the processes and distributions of government. The selection of
substantive values and ideology, however, is left to the legislature. See id. at 87. Judi-
cial intervention is appropriate only when the political processes are inadequate to
serve the twin goals-protection of minorities and broad participation in the political
process-of the Constitution. See id. at 86, 103. Ely thus contends that procedural and
participatory values are the only ones that judges should use to interpret the Constitu-
tion, and that legislators, not judges, are the agents for implementing society's values in
a representative democracy. See id. at 101-02.
34 Id. at 181.
11 Id. at 75 n.*.
" Almost every aspect of Ely's theory has been criticized in some respect. In a
sense this is a measure of the power and resilience of Ely's theory, for despite this
criticism it maintains its impact. Two recent symposiums on constitutional law offer
numerous articles criticizing Ely's thought. See Constitutional Adjudication and Dem-
ocratic Theory, supra note 14; Judicial Review versus Democracy, supra note 14; see
also Berger, Ely's "Theory of Judicial Review," 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 87, 129-30 (1981)
(claiming that Ely's theory of virtual representation negates majority rule); Parker, The
1986]
946 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
that since the former values are in reality values of the latter sort, a
judge can never really engage in judicial review without regard to sub-
stantive values found outside the four corners of the Constitution it-
self.3 7 Ely, however, does not claim to reject substantive values; he has
embraced a certain class of them. It is true that judicial review seeking
to implement the participatory and procedural values required by the
Constitution necessarily involves substantive judgments, but it does not
follow that a judge is relegated to a wholesale implementation of ex-
traconstitutional values. The substantive issues involved in such review
must be resolved by the judge in a manner that will create the kind of
representative democracy promised by the Constitution.3
Past of Constitutional Theory-And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223, 232-35 (1981)
(arguing that Ely's theory, though less problematic than some, is nonetheless vulnerable
to political controversy, thereby revealing the futility of conventional constitutional the-
ory); Perry, Noninterpretive Review in Human Rights Cases: A Functional Justifica-
tion, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 278, 318-23 (1981) (claiming that Ely's approach of praising
noninterpretive review of first amendment and equal protection cases and condemning
substantive due process is inconsistent); Sager, Rights Skepticism and Process-Based
Responses, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 417, 426-32 (1981) (arguing that attempts to deploy
utilitarian arguments in support of rights to fair treatment are unpersuasive);
Sandalow, The Distrust of Politics, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 446, 460-68 (1981) (claiming
that Ely's distrust of politics rests on unarticulated views about the proper direction of
public policy); Tribe, supra note 14, at 1064 (arguing that Ely's process theory is
meaningless unless supplemented with a full theory of substantive rights and values);
Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of the Town: The Contribution of John Hart Ely to
Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1038 (1980) (claiming that "representa-
tion-reinforcing review necessarily involves judicial displacement of citizens' choices").
"' Ronald Dworkin is one of the most articulate proponents of this position. See
Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 469 (1981). In Dworkin's view,
"Judges cannot decide . . . which political process is really fair or democratic, unless
they make substantive political decisions of just the sort the proponents of . . . [proce-
dural review] think judges should not make." Id. at 470. Dworkin believes that he
uncovers a fatal flaw in Ely's argument in demonstrating that judges are forced to make
substantive value judgments in choosing which process is best. Id. at 504. By choosing
among competing notions of democracy, a judge behaves undemocratically and thus
violates Ely's premise that courts should be faithful to the Constitution's promise of a
representative democracy. See id. at 500-10.
Dworkin bases his argument on the assumption that Ely makes a distinction be-
tween substance and procedure per se. See id. at 501. Ely, however, distinguishes be-
tween the substantive values of process and participation and other substantive values.
See J. ELY, supra note 14, at 75 n.*.
38 Ely relies on the existence of a viable distinction between the imposition of the
values of process and participation and the imposition of other substantive values. An
equal protection case could serve as an example of this distinction. A judge enforcing
substantive values in an equal protection case asks herself whether the impact of the
law is fair; that is, whether the law treats people equally, and, if not, whether there are
legitimate, permissible reasons offered for treating some individuals better than others.
On the other hand, a judge enforcing only the values of process and participation asks
herself how a legislature should behave in a representative democracy. She may posit
that democracy requires that the legislature give equal consideration to the views of all
constituents. The judge would then inquire whether in the process of legislation the
legislature has in fact inadequately represented some particular group.
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By adopting a "participation-oriented, representation-reinforcing
approach to judicial review,"391 Ely provides the Supreme Court with a
role that is consonant with the text and historical development of our
Constitution." At the same time, by limiting the Court's concerns to
those of process and participation, he avoids the problems associated
with those who advocate that the Court engage in substantive review of
the choices made by the political branches of the government.41
Ely's notion of a judicial review that is consonant with the overall
intent of the ratifiers gives us a workable framework for analyzing par-
ticular sections of the Constitution. His emphasis on representative de-
mocracy as the cornerstone of the ratifiers' intent allows the Court to
engage in historical inquiries that focus on the Constitution's underly-
ing promise in order to discern the meaning of open-ended provisions.
The Comment now turns to an analysis of the historical underpinnings
of article V in order to provide a basis for understanding the allocation
of institutional power in constitutional conventions.
II. THE INSTITUTIONAL POWER CONFIGURATIONS OF ARTICLE V
Article V of the Constitution serves to ensure that the federal gov-
ernment represents the people by providing the people with the means
to change the government when it no longer meets their needs. Ques-
tions about how this change is to come about and who has the power to
control the convention process are, however, not answered by the text
The difference between these approaches lies in the standard that the judge im-
poses. Bald appeals to substantive values impose norms rooted in the judge's own sense
of morality and justice as it is shaped by the judge's community. Appeals to the values
of participation and process impose norms whose locus is a constitutional vision of rep-
resentative democracy.
39 J. ELY, supra note 14, at 87.
40 Ely explains the decisions of the Warren Court as the first time that the Court
concerned itself seriously with the proper functioning of the democratic process. See id.
at 74. Rather than interpreting the decisions of this Court as an attempt to implement
fundamental values, Ely sees the Warren Court as pursuing the "participational" goal
of "broadened access to the processes and bounty of representative government." Id. at
74 (footnote omitted). Armed with this interpretation of the Court's controversial deci-
sions, he is able to justify them in terms of the ratifiers' intent and earlier decisions of
the Court. See id. at 75-104.
41 Ely uses the term "noninterpretivists" to characterize those who believe that
such substantive review is appropriate. See id. at 1. The goal of this type of review is to
give content to the Constitution's open-ended provisions by enforcing "fundamental"
values. See id. at 43. Ely contends that such an endeavor is futile, see id. at 71, regard-
less of the particular method used to determine the content of the fundamental values to
be applied. See id. at 44-48 (judge's own values), 48-54 (natural law), 54-56 (neutral
principles), 56-60 (reason), 60-63 (tradition), 63-69 (consensus), 69-70 (predicting pro-
gress). In Ely's view, the futility stems from both the impossibility of determining "fun-
damental" values, see id. at 71, and the inappropriateness of courts performing such a
role in a democracy. See id. at 45, 70.
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alone. This section argues that Congress's role in conventions is limited
to calling for one. It then examines the historical context within which
article V was adopted and concludes that the ratifiers intended the
states to exercise initial control over the amendment process. Finally, it
argues that this initial allocation of power to the states does not pre-
clude judicial review of convention activities to assure that the process
by which a proposed amendment is ratified does not violate the guaran-
tees of the fourteenth amendment.
Let us consider first the language of article V:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall
deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Consti-
tution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two
thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for pro-
posing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to
all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when
ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several
States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one
or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the
Congress .... 42
The article is addressed to the Congress, and the procedure is
straightforward and remarkably clear. The amendment process can be
triggered by only two agents: two-thirds of both Houses or two-thirds
of the state legislatures. If the former acts, article V commands that
Congress propose amendments; if the latter acts, Congress "shall call"
a convention. All that remains for Congress is to choose a "mode" of
ratification. This language, however, tells us little about article V's al-
location of power to resolve issues arising out of a constitutional
convention.
Congress clearly has some role to play in the amendment process.
It must determine when "two thirds of both Houses . . .deem it nec-
essary" to propose amendments or when "the Legislatures of two thirds
of the several States" have made an "application." 4 This does not,
however, give Congress much discretion in the amendment procedure.
,2 U.S. CONsT. art. V.
"' Congress can refuse an application because it did not come from a state "legis-
lature." See Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 226-27 (1920) (holding unconstitutional an
attempt by Ohio to require ratification of the eighteenth amendment by referendum
when Congress had submitted it to the states for ratification by state legislatures);
AFL-CIO v. Eu, 36 Cal. 3d 687, 703-06, 686 P.2d 609, 620-22, 206 Cal. Rptr. 89,
100-02 (1984) (holding that as a matter of federal law, article V requires that applica-
tions be authorized by voting in state legislatures rather than state referendums).
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As James Iredell noted in the ratification debates:
[I]t was very evident that [whether the Constitution was
amended] did not depend on the will of Congress; for . . .
the legislatures of two thirds of the states were authorized to
make application for calling a convention to propose amend-
ments, and, on such application, it is provided that Congress
shall call such a convention, so that they will have no
option."'
It thus appears that Congress's role in the amendment process is
very limited. Article V instructs Congress that it must call for a consti-
tutional convention if two-thirds of the state legislatures request one.45
John Dickinson worded this idea more forcefully in stating:
It cannot be with reason apprehended, that Congress
will refuse to act upon any articles calculated to promote the
common welfare, though they may be unwilling to act upon
such as are designed to advance partial interests: but,
whatever their sentiments may be, they must call a conven-
tion for proposing amendments, on applications of two-thirds
of the legislatures of the several states.48
Given the limited discretion of Congress in calling for a constitu-
tional convention,4 7 it would be surprising if the ratifiers intended Con-
gress to control the convention. Although there was little discussion of
the convention process at the first constitutional convention or during
the ratification debates, it is possible to discern from the ratifiers' gen-
eral conception of the relationship between state and federal power and
their general understanding of the nature of constitutional revision that
they saw the states as the political body that would exercise power in
constitutional conventions.
The ratifiers saw article V's convention process as a constitutional
provision offering the states the power to protect themselves from the
'" 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 178 (J. Elliot ed. 1836) [hereinafter dted as EL-
LIOT'S DEBATES].
'5 The term "legislature" as used in article V has been interpreted to mean "the
representative body which ma[kes] the laws of the people." See Hawke v. Smith, 253
U.S. 221, 227 (1920). If the application does not come from such a body, Congress
need not act on it.
"I Dickinson, Letter VIII in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTrrUTION 204, 210 (P.
Ford ed. 1888).
47 In the words of Alexander Hamilton, "Nothing in this particular is left to the
discretion of [Congress]." THE FEDERALIST No. 85, at 526 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
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evils of a central government.48 Although the ratifiers recognized that
the states would have to surrender some of their power to the federal
government in order to develop an effective union, there was wide disa-
greement over how much power the states should retain.49 Many of the
48 Pelatiah Webster, a Philadelphia merchant writing in favor of ratification,
wrote that
[critics] ...sound[] objections, and fears on extreme cases of abuse or
misapplication of supreme powers, which may possibly happen, under the
administration of a wild, weak or wicked Congress; . . .[but abuses] do
not often appear . . .[and] if they should happen . . . there is a remedy
pointed out, in the Constitution itself.
'Tis not supposeable that such abuses could arise to any ruinous
height, before they would affect the States so much, that at least two-
thirds of them would unite in pursuing a remedy in the mode prescribed
by the Constitution, which will always be liable to amendment ....
Webster, The Weakness of Brutus exposed: or some Remarks in Vindication of the
Constitution, in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION 119, 126 (P. Ford ed. 1888).
Concern for the prevention of tyranny, as well as for the creation of national
unity, led to a desire to balance the powers of the federal government and the states.
This is evidenced by Number 51 of the Federalist Papers, which claimed that "[iln the
compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided
into two distinct governments . . . .The different governments will control each other,
at the same that each will be controlled by itself." THE FEDERAUST No. 51, at 323 (A.
Hamilton or J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
4' Nearly everyone conceded the weakness of the Confederation and recognized
the need for change. See G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 471
(1969). As Merrill Jensen has explained, however,
[T]he best of the [Antifederalists] agreed that the central government
needed more power, but they wanted that power given so as not to alter
the basic character of the Articles of Confederation. Here is where they
were in fundamental disagreement with the [Federalists] who wanted to
remove the central government from the control of the state legislatures.
M. JENSEN, THE NEW NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE
CONFEDERATION 1781-1789, at 424-25 (1950). The Antifederalists warned that a cen-
tral government, independent of the states, would inevitably become a tyranny. Centinel
complained, "From this investigation into the organization of this government [under
the Constitution], it appears that it is devoid of all responsibility or accountability to the
great body of the people, and that so far from being a regular balanced government, it
would be in practice a permanent ARISTOCRACY." Centinel, Letter I, in THE AN-
TIFEDERALIST 13, 19 (1985) (abridgement by M. Dry of THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDER-
ALIST (H. Storing ed. 1981)). Others voiced fears that a single government presiding
over such a large territory could never truly serve the people:
[A] free republic cannot succeed over a country of such immense extent,
containing such a number of inhabitants, and these encreasing in such
rapid progression as that of the whole United States. . . . "In a large
republic, the public good is sacrificed to a thousand views . . . . In a
small one, the interest of the public is easier perceived, better understood,
and more within reach of every citizen ... .
Brutus, Essay I, in THE ANTIFEDERALIST, supra, at 108, 113 (quoting C. MONTES-
QUIEU, I THE SPIRIT OF LAWS, Book VIII, ch. 16, at 120 (T. Nugent trans. 1900)).
In contrast, the Federalists perceived the states to be the cause of factionalism that
could be controlled only by forming a stronger centralized government. To Madison,
this was one of the most important goals of a new Union: "Among the numerous ad-
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participants in the debates viewed assertions of power by a central gov-
ernment with deep suspicion, believing that the federal government
would inevitably encroach upon the sovereignty of the states.50 Cen-
tinel, one of the most forceful critics of the Constitution, wrote that
whatever taxes, duties and excises that [the Congress]
may deem requisite for the general welfare, may be imposed
on the citizens of these states, levied by the officers of Con-
gress, [and] distributed through every district in America;
and the collection would be enforced by the standing army,
however grievous or improper they may be. The Congress
may construe every purpose for which the state legislatures
vantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately
developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction." THE FEDER-
ALIST No. 10, at 77 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Later Madison wrote, "An irregular and
mutable legislation is not more an evil in itself than it is odious to the people; and ...
the great body of them ...will never be satisfied till some remedy be applied to the
vicissitudes and uncertainties which characterize the State administrations." Id. No. 37,
at 226-27. For a further elaboration on the opposing views of the Federalists and Anti-
federalists, see G. WooD, supra, at 516-36.
50 The proposed constitution was viewed by many as an instrument that would
destroy the independence of the states and individual liberties. In the Maryland de-
bates, Luther Martin focused almost exclusively on the threat posed to the states:
When I took my seat in the Convention, I found [the Federalists]
attempting to bring forward a system which ...I considered not only
injurious to the interest and rights of this state, but also incompatible with
the political happiness and freedom of the states in general ...
n . . [S]o destructive do I consider the present system to the happi-
ness of my country, I would cheerfully sacrifice the share of property with
which Heaven has blessed a life of industry ... and those who are
dearer to me than my own existence I would intrust to the care and pro-
tection of that Providence . . . if on those terms only I could procure my
country to reject those chains which are forged for it.
1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 44, at 388-89.
Thomas Tredwell, in the New York debates, took up the fear of many that their
liberties were being encroached upon:
Is this, sir, a government for freemen? Are we thus to be duped out
of our liberties? I hope, sir, our affairs have not yet arrived to that long-
wished-foi pitch of confusion, that we are under the necessity of accepting
a system of government such as this.
• ..We are called upon at this time (I think it is an early day) to
make an unconditional surrender of those rights which ought to be dearer
to us than our lives.
• ..We ought, sir, to consider ...that we may now give away, by
a vote, what it may cost the dying groans of thousands to recover; that we
may now surrender, with a little ink, what it may cost seas of blood to
regain; the dagger of Ambition is now pointed at the fair bosom of Lib-
erty, and, to deepen and complete the tragedy, we, her sons, are called
upon to give the fatal thrust. Shall we not ...all cry out with one voice,
"Hands off!" . . . A moment's hesitation would ever prove us to be bas-
tards, not sons.
2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 44, at 403-04.
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now lay taxes, to be for the general welfare, and thereby
seize upon every object of revenue.
• . . [T]he all-prevailing power of taxation, and . ..
extensive legislative and judicial powers are vested in the
general government, [and] must in their operation, necessa-
rily absorb the state legislature and judicatories .... 51
Those who argued for ratification were able finally to persuade
the majority that the federal government's powers under the Constitu-
tion were limited in nature,52 and that those powers not claimed in the
language of the Constitution for the federal government were reserved
to the states. 53 As James Wilson explained:
"In delegating federal powers, another criterion was necessa-
rily introduced, and the congressional power is to be col-
lected, not from tacit implication, but from the positive grant
expressed in the instrument of the union. Hence, it is evi-
dent, that in the [federal government] . . .everything which
is not given is reserved.1
54
Since control over the conventions is not given to Congress, it is reason-
able to conclude that the ratifiers assumed that the states retained the
power to control constitutional conventions.
The ratifiers read article V in accordance with their overall under-
51 Centinel, Letter I, in THE ANTIFEDERALIST, supra note 49, at 13, 17.
52 James Wilson, in a speech widely circulated throughout the states, argued to
his fellow Pennsylvanians that governments were of two kinds, those that hold every
power not explicitly reserved to the people, and those that hold only those powers ex-
pressly delegated to them by the people. The Constitution, he argues, was established
as a government of the latter kind. See J. McMAsTER & F. STONE, PENNSYLVANIA
AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITrTION 1787-1788, at 143 (1888) (quoting J. Wilson,
Speech at the Pennsylvania State House, quoted in Pennsylvania Packet, Oct. 10,
1787).
Wilson also developed the argument that the limited powers of the federal govern-
ment made a bill of rights unnecessary. According to this view,
"[In a government of enumerated powers], nothing more is intended to be
given than what is so enumerated, unless it results from the nature of
government itself. . . .[I]n a government like the proposed one, there can
be no necessity for a bill of rights. For, on my principle, the people never
part with their power."
Id. at 314. This argument was adopted as the central federalist explanation for the lack
of a bill of rights. See G. WOOD, supra note 49, at 539-40.
53 Madison claimed that "the proposed government cannot be deemed a national
one; since its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the
several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects." THE FED-
ERALIST No. 39, at 245 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
" J. McMAsTER & F. STONE, supra note 52, at 143 (quoting J. Wilson, Speech
at the Pennsylvania State House, quoted in Pennsylvania Packet, Oct. 10, 1787).
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standing of the relationship between state and federal power and as the
ultimate protection for state sovereignty. Supporters of the Constitution
presented article V as a safety mechanism controlled by the states.5 5 As
Alexander Hamilton explained, article V allowed "the State legisla-
tures to erect barriers against the encroachments of the national author-
ity.""" Similarly, James Iredell attempted to reassure those skeptical of
the purportedly limited nature of the federal government by explaining
that if Congress proved unresponsive to the people's desire to change,
then "two thirds of the legislatures of the different states may require a
general convention . . . in which case Congress are under the necessity
of convening one."
'57
That the ratifiers construed article V to allocate power over a con-
vention to the states should not be surprising in light of the historical
context in which the Constitution was adopted. The states had estab-
lished their own independent governments in the years following the
Declaration of Independence" and jealously guarded their powers.59
Although many were willing to concede the need for a stronger central
government than that which the Articles of Confederation had pro-
15 Consider the comment of J.C. Jarvis of Massachusetts:
I have found complete satisfaction [in article V]: this has been a resting
place, on which I have reposed myself in the fullest security, whenever a
doubt has occurred, in considering any other passage in the proposed Con-
stitution. . . . When we shall have adopted the Constitution before us, we
shall have in this article an adequate provision for all the purposes of
political reformation. If . . . this government shall appear to be too se-
vere, here are the means by which this severity may be assuaged and
corrected.
2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 44, at 116-17.
"6 THE FEDERALIST No. 85, at 526 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
57 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 44, at 176-78:
58 See, e.g., M. JENSEN, supra note 49, at 127 (explaining that during the Con-
federation "the separate American states were sovereign and independent").
59 Alexander Hamilton saw the inability of the states to reach agreement as one of
the major flaws of the Articles of Confederation:
In our case, the concurrence of thirteen distinct sovereign wills is requisite
under the Confederation to the complete execution of every important
measure that proceeds from the Union. . . . Each State yielding to the
passionate voice of immediate interest or convenience has successively
withdrawn its support, till the frail and tottering edifice seems ready to
fall upon our heads and to crush us beneath its ruins.
THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 112-13 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). At the same time, he saw
the jealousy of the states as threatening the passage of the Constitution. See THE FED-
ERALIST No. 1.
The fight against the factionalism caused by the conflicting interests of the various
states became the "center of the Federalist perception of politics." G. WOOD, supra
note 49, at 502. The institution of a national government independent of, and superior
to, the states was seen as an essential part of the solution to the problem of factional-
ism. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison).
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vided,60 they were unwilling to surrender their sovereignty completely
to a higher government. 1
In short, article V provided the ratifiers with a constitutional cure-
all, a security blanket that gave them the courage to consent to a central
government. A provision understood by those who ratified the Constitu-
tion to be special protection from the evils of centralized government
would not be effective if it were controlled by the central government.
Article V had to leave one avenue of amendment almost entirely within
the realm of state power.
This allocation of power to the states, however, must be read in
light of the general revolution in thought that occurred during the sev-
enteenth and eighteenth centuries. 2 The atmosphere of revolution and
upheaval gave the American people as a whole a sense of their own
60 See J. MAIN, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF THE CONSTITUTION 1781-
1788, at 113-14 (1961). All participants in the debates agreed that change was neces-
sary. See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 44, at 385 (statement of T. Tredwell)
("It is on all hands acknowledged that the federal government [under the Articles of
Confederation] is not adequate to the purpose of the Union."); 4 id. at 25 (statement of
James Galloway) ("As to the weakness of the Confederation, we all know it.").
61 The very terms of the ratification debates illustrate the assumptions made about
the powers of the states. The debates focused on whether the states would be giving up
too much power under the Constitution, with all participants assuming that the states
must maintain some sovereignty. See, e.g., A. McLAUGHLIN, THE CONFEDERATION
AND THE CONSTITUTION 1783-1789, at 164 (1962) ("This new political idea [of two
sovereign governments] . . . did not involve the establishment of a national government
which was to be superior to the state governments."). Madison tried to assure the skep-
tics with the following:
The operations of the federal government will be most extensive and
important in times of war and danger; those of the State governments in
times of peace and security. As the former periods will probably bear a
small proportion to the latter, the State governments will here enjoy an-
other advantage over the federal government. The more adequate, indeed,
the federal powers may be rendered to the national defense, the less fre-
quent will be those scenes of danger which might favor their ascendancy
over the governments of the particular States.
THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 293 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). The means chosen to select
members of the Senate serves to illustrate further the desire to maintain the sovereignty
of the states. Madison remarked that
[T]he equal vote allowed to each State is at once a constitutional recogni-
tion of the portion of sovereignty remaining in the individual States and an
instrument for preserving that residuary sovereignty. So far the equality
ought to be no less acceptable to the large than to the small States; since
they are not less solicitous to guard, by every possible expedient, against
an improper consolidation of the States into one simple republic.
Id. No. 62, at 378 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
62 See B. BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 22-54
(1967) (examining the American colonists' use of European, and in particular, British,
thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries).
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power. As Gordon Wood has explained:
Transferring sovereignty from the legislative bodies to
the people-at-large outside of all governmental institutions
represented far more than simply an intellectual shift of a
political conception. . . . [T]he Americans were fundamen-
tally unsettling the traditional understanding of how the peo-
ple in a republic were to participate in the government ...
All that had begun in the 1760's with the debate with Eng-
land was now being brought to a head. A series of tiny,
piece-meal changes in thought, no one of which seemed im-
mensely consequential, was preparing Americans for a
revolution in their conceptions of law, constitutionalism, and
politics."3
The ratifiers' general understanding of the nature of government
must have influenced their reading of article V. They believed that the
people were the foundation of all governments, and that the individual
was the essential political unit." The uncontroverted remarks of James
Wilson in the Pennsylvania debates indicate how these beliefs influ-
enced the ratifiers' understanding of the process of change:
Perhaps some politician, who has not considered with
sufficient accuracy our political systems, would answer that,
in our governments, the supreme power was vested in the
constitutions. This opinion approaches a step nearer to the
truth, but does not reach it. The truth is, that, in our govern-
ments, the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power re-
mains in the people. As our constitutions are superior to our
legislatures, so the people are superior to our constitutions.
Indeed, the superiority, in this last instance, is much greater;
for the people possess over our constitutions control in act, as
well as right.
63 G. WOOD, supra note 49, at 383.
James Wilson, one of the principal federalists, asked:
Upon what principle is it contended that the sovereign power resides
in the state governments? The honorable gentleman has said truly, that
there can be no subordinate sovereignty. Now if there can not, my position
is, that the sovereignty resides in the people. They have not parted with it;
they have only dispensed such portions of power as were conceived neces-
sary for the public welfare. This constitution stands upon this broad
principle.
J. McMASTER & F. STONE, supra note 52, at 301-02; see also G. WOOD, supra note
49, at 530-36 (examining the Federalists' position on the primacy of the individual and
the use to which they put this belief in the debates over the ratification of the
Constitution).
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The consequence is, that the people may change the
constitutions whenever and however they please. This is a
right of which no positive institution can ever deprive them.
...In this Constitution, all authority is derived from
the people.65
Thus, although article V may be read to allocate power over con-
ventions to the states, ultimately this power is vested in the the people
themselves. Wilson proclaimed the power of the people in the strongest
of terms:
That the supreme power, therefore, should be vested in the
people, is ...the great panacea of human politics. It is a
power paramount to every constitution, inalienable in its na-
ture, indefinite in its extent. For I insist, if there are errors
in government, the people have the right not only to correct
and amend them, but likewise totally to change and reject its
form; and under the operation of that right, the citizens of
the United States can never be wretched beyond retrieve, un-
less they are wanting to themselves. 6
The practical political consequence of locating power in the indi-
vidual was the development of a system of representative democracy. As
Madison explained:
[W]e may define a republic to be ...a government
which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the
great body of the people, and is administered by persons
holding their offices ... for a limited period, or during
good behavior. It is essential to such a government that it be
derived from the great body of the society, not from an in-
considerable proportion or a favored class of it; otherwise, a
handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising their oppressions by
a delegation of their powers, might aspire to the rank of
republicans and claim for their government the honorable ti-
tle of republic.
8 7
Only a representative democracy was acceptable to the ratifiers;"8 by
65 2 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 44, at 432-34.
66 J. MCMASTER & F. STONE, supra note 52, at 230.
17 THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 241 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
68 As Madison wrote, "It is evident that no other form would be reconcilable with
the genius of the people of America; with the fundamental principles of the Revolution;
or with that honorable determination which animates every votary of freedom to rest all
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dividing the powers of government between the states and a central
government, the Federalists saw themselves as assuring that the inter-
ests of the people were fully represented. 9
The same view of the individual that led the founders to embrace
a representative democracy resulted in a concern for the protection of
individual rights. One of the criticisms of the Confederation was that
the state legislatures had not properly protected the rights of individu-
als.7 0 The federal government was seen as providing protection from
the majoritarian tyrannies threatened by the power of the state legisla-
tures.71 The federal judiciary served, in the founders' eyes, as a further
safeguard for individual rights. As Hamilton noted, limits on legislative
authority "can be preserved in practice no other way than through the
medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts
contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void."
'72
It is the perception of the individual as the locus of all political
power that gives the Supreme Court the authority to review states' arti-
cle V activities. The fourteenth amendment extended to the states the
duty to adhere to the Constitution and made explicit the promise of
representative democracy envisioned by the ratifiers. 8 By adopting the
fourteenth amendment, therefore, the states subjected their activities to
review by the Supreme Court.
Ely's argument that the Court should protect the procedural and
participatory values that fulfill the Constitution's promise of a repre-
sentative democracy applies with special force to issues arising under
article V, for it is article V that provides the people with the ultimate
voice in their government-the ability to change it. Through the
amendment process, the people come to form the foundations of their
society. The legitimacy of the Constitution is rooted in the document's
our political experiments on the capacity of mankind for self-government." THE FED-
ERALIST No. 39, at 240 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
"9 Madison explained the balance between the two types of governments as a
means to protect representational government. In his view:
By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the representa-
tive too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser inter-
ests; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these,
and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great national objects. The
federal Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great
and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and partic-
ular to the State legislatures.
Id. No. 10, at 83 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
70 See G. DIETZE, THE FEDERALIST: A CLASSIC ON FEDERALISM AND FREE
GOVERNMENT 130-37 (1960).
71 See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison).
71 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 466 (C. Rossiter ed. 1966).
71 See J. ELY, .supra note 14, at 98.
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promise of a government that represents the collective will of the people
and respects the sovereignty of the individual. It is entirely appropriate,
therefore, that the process of amending the Constitution be susceptible
to attack under the fourteenth amendment should it stray from the
standards of representative democracy. Judicial review of states' article
V activities would impose democratic standards on these activities and
would allow amendments resulting from undemocratic and unrepre-
sentative processes to be declared void.
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARTICLE V ACTIVITY
Any suggestion for judicial review of attempts to amend the Con-
stitution must address the problems raised by the political question doc-
trine, in general, and the particular approach to constitutional amend-
ments articulated by the Court in Coleman v. Miller.4 This Comment
argues that neither Coleman nor the political question doctrine in gen-
eral presents a complete barrier to judicial review of article V activities.
It then suggests that the Court review the states' article V activities,
including issues such as delegate selection, to ensure that the process by
which an amendment is adopted by a state adheres to the procedural
requirements of the fourteenth amendment.
A. The Political Question Doctrine
Although there are a number of cases supporting a Supreme Court
review of issues arising out of constitutional conventions, 5 it could be
74 307 U.S. 433 (1939). In addition to the political question doctrine, standing is a
potential problem for litigants contesting the constitutionality of the amendment pro-
cess. An analysis of the issue of standing is beyond the scope of this Comment. The
legal tests adopted by the Court to determine standing fall to provide litigants with a
reliable test for predicting whether a plaintiff will have standing in a particular case.
As Professor Nichol has written, "[T]he Court's existing body of law [on standing]
reflects a state of intellectual crisis .... The result is a schizophrenic body of law in
which the Court announces that one set of interests are dispositive . . . while in the
bulk of the major cases other factors appear to prevail . . ." Nichol, Rethinking
Standing, 72 CAUF. L. REv. 68, 69-70 (1984). For other recent discussions of the
standing issue, see, for example, Fallon, Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law
Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1984); Logan,
Standing to Sue: A Proposed Separation of Powers Analysis, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 34
(1984); The Supreme Court, Leading Cases of the 1983 Term, 98 HARV. L. REV. 87,
236-46 (1984).
11 See United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716 (1931) (rejecting the argument that
the eighteenth amendment had to be adopted via a constitutional convention and up-
holding the validity of the amendment); Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922) (up-
holding the validity of the nineteenth amendment against attacks directed at the ratifi-
cation process and allegations that the ratification by certain states was invalid); Dillon
v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921) (upholding the ability of Congress to limit the time in
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argued that the political question doctrine bars a fourteenth amendment
challenge to a state's article V activities. In a nutshell, the problem is
thit the Court's review of constitutional convention activity must not
threaten or undermine "either the independence and integrity of one of
the branches or levels of government, or the ability of each to fulfill its
mission in checking the others so as to preserve the interdependence
without which independence can become domination. '7 6 Contrary to
the contentions of some commentators,7 7 however, the political question
doctrine does not present an absolute bar to judicial review of article V
activity. Thus, a plaintiff should be able to challenge a state's selection
of delegates to a constitutional convention, for example, on the grounds
that the selection process did not provide for the adequate representa-
tion of minorities.
The political question doctrine is one aspect of the separation-of-
powers principle of justiciability. A political question is nonjusticiable
because it does not present a "case" or "controversy" in the sense that
the constitutional provision on which the litigants rely in pressing a
political question does not implicate judicially enforceable rights.7 8 As
the Supreme Court explained in Baker v. Carr:
79
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a politi-
cal question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;
or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking inde-
pendent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
which a proposed amendment can be ratified by the states); The National Prohibition
Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920) (rejecting procedural challenges to the validity of the eight-
eenth amendment); Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920) (holding that the power of a
state legislature to ratify a proposed amendment to the Constitution is derived from the
Federal Constitution and therefore holding unconstitutional a provision in a state con-
stitution that reserved to the people of the state the power to ratify a proposed amend-
ment to the federal Constitution by way of referendum); Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3
U.S. (1 Dall.) 378 (1798) (holding that the eleventh amendment was constitutionally
adopted even though the amendment was never presented to the President for his
approval).
16 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTONAL LAW § 2-2, at 15 (1978) (footnote
omitted).
"' See, e.g., Goldberg, The Proposed Constitutional Convention, 11 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 1, 2-3 (1983); Millet, The Supreme Court, Political Questions, and Arti-
cle V-A Case for Judicial Restraint, 23 SANTA CLARA L. RPv. 745, 755-68 (1983).
71 See L. TRIBE, supra note 76, at § 3-16.
79 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifari-
ous pronouncements by various departments on one
question.80
When the issue involved does present the Court with questions about
judicially enforceable rights and does not intrude into the other
branches of the federal government, it is not a political question and
may be decided by the Court.
Coleman v. Miller,8' in which the Court refused to decide a dis-
pute over a proposed amendment, may present an obstacle to judicial
review of states' article V activities.8 2 Two factors, however, diminish
the potential impact of this case on the issues addressed in this Com-
ment. First, Coleman may be easily distinguished from the kind of case
that this Comment suggests is appropriate for the Court's review. Sec-
ond, the Court's willingness to avoid the political question doctrine in
certain situations since the Coleman decision indicates that the review
suggested here would not run afoul of the Court's present understand-
ing of the doctrine.88
Coleman involved the validity of Kansas' ratification of a proposed
child labor amendment. The Kansas legislature had initially rejected
the amendment in 1925, but it was reintroduced in the state Senate in
1937. When the Senate vote split evenly, the Lieutenant Governor
broke the tie with a vote in favor of ratification." The Kansas senators
who voted against the amendment filed a suit questioning the Lieuten-
ant Governor's right to cast the deciding vote in favor of ratification
and arguing that the ratification was invalid because it was previously
rejected and because of the lapse of time between the two considerations
of the amendment.8 5
80 Id. at 217.
81 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
82 Professor Walter Dellinger provides a powerful criticism of the Coleman deci-
sion in his recent article, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the
Amendment Process, supra note 13. As he explains, Coleman essentially precludes ju-
dicial review of amendment disputes and adopts the position that congressional promul-
gation is the mechanism to resolve such disputes. Dellinger argues that such congres-
sional authority is not supported by the text of article V, is contrary to pre-1939
judicial precedent, is consistent with only one example of prior congressional practice, is
"dysfunctional," and is a source of uncertainty about the amendment process. Id. at
389-405.
83 See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (holding that Congressman
Powell's challenge to his exclusion from the House of Representatives did not raise a
political question); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding that Tennessee's ap-
portionment of voting districts did not raise a political question).
11 See Coleman, 307 U.S. at 435-36.
85 See id. at 436.
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The Supreme Court split evenly over the justiciability of the chal-
lenge to the Lieutenant Governor's vote and expressed no opinion on
the matter.8 The Court also declined to decide the effect of Kansas'
prior rejection and the lapse of time between the proposal of the
amendment and its ratification. Relying on "historic precedent,"8 7 the
Court tied its own hands with the political question doctrine: these is-
sues were found nonjusticiable 8
Coleman, however, does not address whether the Court's review of
the amendment process violates the political question doctrine. The de-
cision holds merely that whether a ratification has occurred is a politi-
cal question. Coleman does not preclude the judicial review of all arti-
cle V activity, because the Court did not address the justiciability of the
petitioners' attack on the manner of ratification. The Court may con-
cede that the effect of prior rejection and the reasonableness of the time
lapse between proposal and ratification are political questions and still
maintain that questions arising out of a constitutional convention are
reviewable under the fourteenth amendment.89
The issues declared nonjusticiable in Coleman involved whether
ratification had occurred as a matter of law: the petitioners sought a
88 See id. at 447.
87 Id. at 450. The "historic precedent" on which the Coleman Court based its
position was the refusal by Congress to recognize New Jersey's and Ohio's withdrawal
of approval of the fourteenth amendment when Congress adopted a joint resolution to
promulgate that amendment. See id. at 448-49. Professor Dellinger has criticized this
reliance very successfully, pointing out that this "historic precedent" lost any practical
significance two years later, when Congress debated but never adopted a resolution to
promulgate the fifteenth amendment. Dellinger contends that Congress has never
passed a resolution promulgating any of the other amendments, and even the resolution
promulgating the fourteenth amendment was passed with little debate. Moreover, the
Coleman Court, according to Dellinger, ignored a prior Supreme Court ruling that the
amendment process is complete as soon as the required number of states have voted for
ratification. See Dellinger, supra note 13, at 397-403.
" See Coleman, 307 U.S. at 450-51, 453-54.
89 A strong indication that the Court understands this to be the case is found in
Uhler v. AFL-CIO, 105 S. Ct. 5 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1985), in which Justice
Rehnquist was asked to stay a decision of the California Supreme Court. The Califor-
nia court held that an initiative to force the California legislature to request Congress
to call a constitutional convention could not be placed on California's November 1984
ballot, because to do so would violate the California constitution as well as article V of
the United States Constitution. See AFL-CIO v. Eu, 36 Cal. 3d 684, 687, 686 P.2d
609, 613, 206 Cal. Rptr. 89, 93 (1984). Justice Rehnquist declined to review the fed-
eral part of the California court's opinion because he found that the decision could
stand independently on its state law grounds and that any review of the federal law
holdings would thus be no more than "advisory opinions." Furthermore, he specifically
rejected the argument advanced by the petitioner that the state court lacked jurisdiction
because the referendum issue was a nonjusticiable political question; "I do not think a
majority [of the present Court] would subscribe to petitioners' expansive reading of the
'political question' doctrine in connection with the amending process." Id. at 6 (citing
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)).
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declaration that the contested ratification either occurred too late or was
precluded because it has been rejected previously. The convention issues
discussed in this Comment involve whether the article V activities of
the states violate the fourteenth amendment. Coleman tells us that the
Court is not to involve itself in the political struggles of the states, but it
does not prohibit judicial scrutiny to ensure that the rights of the citi-
zens of the states are protected. Moreover, two more recent cases on the
political question doctrine, Baker v. Carr90 and Powell v. McCor-
mack,91 suggest that the doctrine would not bar judicial review of con-
vention issues involving representational concerns.
Baker held that an attack on a Tennessee statute apportioning
representatives over the state's ninety-five counties was justiciable.92
The Court rejected the contention that the political question doctrine
barred review of cases involving political rights, finding such an argu-
ment "little more than a play upon words.""3 That the case involved
political rights in fact legitimated review by the Court. By challenging
the Tennessee state legislature's apportionment of representatives, the
plaintiffs were challenging "the consistency of state action with the fed-
eral constitution."'" Because the issue was not "to be decided by a po-
litical branch of government coequal with [the] Court,""5 was not likely
to cause embarrassment abroad or great disturbance at home, 6 and was
not an issue for which'the Court lacked judicial standards,97 the case
was not barred by the political question doctrine.
In Powell v. McCormack,98 the Court further demonstrated its re-
luctance to invoke the political question doctrine when political rights
not delegated to another branch of the government by the Constitution
are involved. Powell involved Adam Clayton Powell's claim that the
House of Representatives had unconstitutionally excluded him from his
- 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
91 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
92 369 U.S. at 237 (referring to provisions of the Tennessee Code set forth in
Baker, 369 U.S. at 237 app.). The plaintiffs claimed that the apportionment of repre-
sentatives by the Tennessee state legislature violated their rights under the equal pro-
tection clause. Since no reapportionment proposals had passed in both houses of the
state's legislature since 1901, the composition of the state legislature did not reflect the
large changes in population that occurred from 1901 to 1961. The plaintiffs sought to
enjoin further elections under the 1901 apportionment scheme and to have a new ap-
portionment enacted according to the most recent federal census figures. See id. at 191-
95.
9 Id. at 209 (quoting Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540 (1927)).




s 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
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seat.919 Although the Court found a "'textually demonstrable commit-
ment' to Congress to judge ...the qualifications [of members of the
House] expressly set forth in the Constitution," 100 it held that Powell's
exclusion from the House was not a political question reserved to Con-
gress, because Powell had met the Constitution's express qualifica-
tions.101 Powell's suit against the House of Representatives "require[d]
no more than an interpretation of the Constitution."1 Such a determi-
nation fell "within the traditional role accorded courts to interpret
law"1 03 and was not political in any of the senses suggested by the
Baker decision.
The Court's criteria in Baker and Powell for determining whether
an issue is justiciable under the political question doctrine indicate that
issues arising out of constitutional conventions would not necessarily be
political issues. Challenges to a state legislature's article V activities
would arise under the fourteenth amendment, and would concern the
consistency of the state's activities with the Constitution. For example,
a plaintiff may allege a lack of representation in the state body deciding
whether to adopt a specific constitutional amendment. Issues such as
this are not relegated to the political branches of government. Rather,
the protection of political rights is the Court's function.' The Consti-
tution does not textually commit any of the issues arising out of a con-
stitutional convention to any branch of the federal government, and it
limits Congress's role to proposing amendments or calling for a conven-
tion.105 Deciding what standards the fourteenth amendment imposes on
constitutional conventions requires an "interpretation of the Constitu-
tion," and the Court has been developing standards under the four-
teenth amendment for over a century.
The Court's development of the political question doctrine since
Coleman indicates that review of article V activities under the four-
teenth amendment would not violate the Court's present understanding
of the political question doctrine. The political questions in Coleman
are legitimately distinguishable from a challenge to a state's actions to
1, See id. at 489. Although Congressman Powell met all the qualifications listed
in article I, section 2, as to age, citizenship, and residency, the ninetieth Congress ex-
cluded him from his seat presumably because of his unacceptable, if not illegal, activi-
ties as Chairman of the Committee on Education and Labor during the eighty-nineth
Congress. See id. at 489-95. The Congressman was seated as a member of the ninety-
first Congress. See id. at 495.
100 Id. at 548 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).
101 See id. at 549-50.
102 Id. at 548.
103 Id.
104 See J. ELY, supra note 14, at 101-04.
105 See supra text accompanying notes 42-61.
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amend the Constitution that is based on the claim that the state body
violated the rights of some of its citizens. The issues involved in this
Comment are more similar to the apportionment challenge in Baker
than to the institutional power questions that the plaintiffs attempted to
have the Court address in Coleman. Even if the Court were to continue
to adhere to Coleman, therefore, it could hear a case concerning the
representational rights of citizens in a constitutional convention. Such
issues do not fall into the political question rubric as it is described
recently in Baker and Powell.
A number of cases, moreover, indicate that the Court may articu-
late constitutional standards for the amendment. process. In Hollings-
worth v. Virginia,06 the Court decided that the Constitution does not
require the President's approval of amendments.117 In Hawke v.
Smith, 08 the Court found that when Congress proposes ratification of
an amendment by state legislatures, the Constitution prohibits the
states from requiring ratification by any body other than the state legis-
latures. The Court therefore held unconstitutional Ohio's attempt to
add as an additional ratification requirement that amendments be sub-
mitted to a state referendum.' In the National Prohibition Cases,
10
the Court interpreted article V's requirement that amendments be pro-
posed when "two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary." The
Court held that the requirement is satisfied when two-thirds of both
houses adopt a resolution to propose an amendment,"" and decided
that the constitutional standard of "two thirds" meant two-thirds of
'0' 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798).
10 See id. at 380 n.(a) (Chase, J.) ("The negative of the president applies only to
the ordinary cases of legislation: he has nothing to do with the proposition or adoption
of amendments to the Constitution.").
108 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
109 See id. at 227-28. The Court found that since the method of ratification is
specifically fixed in the Constitution,
[i]t is not the function of courts or legislative bodies, national or state, to
alter the method ....
The only question really for determination is: What did the framers
of the Constitution mean in requiring ratification by "Legislatures"? . . .
Congress and the States understood that election by the people was en-
tirely distinct from legislative action . ...
There can be no question that the framers of the Constitution clearly
understood and carefully used the terms in which the instrument referred
to the action of the legislatures of the States. When they intended that
direct action by the people should be had they were no less accurate in the
use of apt phraseology to carry out such purpose.
Id.
110 253 U.S. 350 (1920).
"I See id. at 386.
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those present in each house, assuming a quorum in both houses, and
not two-thirds of each house's entire membership. 12 In United States
v. Sprague,113 the Court found that article V gave Congress discretion
in deciding whether amendments are ratified in state conventions or by
state legislatures."" There is thus substantial precedent justifying the
Court's articulation of constitutional standards for the amendment
process.
B. Review by the Supreme Court
By reviewing states' article V activities, the Supreme Court can
ensure that states adhere to the values of participation and process in
attempts to amend the Constitution. For an amendment to be valid, the
amendment process must comport with the fourteenth amendment. If a
state's article V activities violate the fourteenth amendment, the state's
ratification should be declared void.
Ely's representation-reinforcing view of judicial review suggests a
number of ways in which the amendment process might fall short of
the standards imposed by the fourteenth amendment.11 5 First, the
method used by a state to select its delegates may be susceptible to at-
tack. If the delegate selection process did not enable the people of a
state to choose their delegates, for example, the Court might hold that
the process failed to adhere to the participatory values inherent in our
constitutional scheme.11 Second, the ratification of the amendment by
the state legislature may be unconstitutional because the legislators did
not adhere to their duty of "virtual representation."11 7 Thus, it could
be argued that an amendment repealing the fifteenth amendment was
invalid on the grounds that the legislators had purposely discriminated
against the interests of their minority constituents in ratifying the
amendment.
How the Supreme Court would ultimately resolve issues such as
these depends on their version of the Constitution's promise of repre-
sentative democracy. The choices that the Supreme Court may be
forced to make clearly involve substantive judgments that impose val-
ues. The values imposed, however, are the values of participation and
process embodied in the Constitution.
An amendment itself cannot violate the Constitution. The Consti-
11 See id.
1S 282 U.S. 716 (1931).
1"' See id. at 730.
115 See supra text accompanying notes 27-32.
216 See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
117 See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
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tution, however, both defines and governs the process by which states
can propose and ratify amendments. Should a state ratification fail to
meet the standards of the fourteenth amendment, that state's ratifica-
tion should be declared invalid. If enough ratifications of a particular
amendment were invalidated by the Supreme Court, the remaining
valid ratifications might total less than the three-quarters required for
the amendment to become effective.
CONCLUSION
Constitutional convention drives will not disappear from American
history, nor should they. The convention process is a legitimate, if little
understood and potentially disruptive, means of amending the
Constitution.
Understanding the article V convention process requires an under-
standing of the Constitution itself. The Constitution promises the peo-
ple of the United States a particular form of govern-
ment-representative democracy. This principle requires the Court to
reveal the Constitution's promise when interpreting the open-ended
provisions of the document. Although article V allocates initial control
over constitutional conventions to the states, the Court must hold states'
article V activities to a constitutional standard: it must insure that the
people receive the process "due" them from the Constitution's promise
of representative democracy in terms of both participation and repre-
sentation. The political question doctrine should not be used to fore-
close court review of the procedural and participatory questions that
may be raised by a convention.
There are many ways in which the Court might play out this
Comment's broad prescriptions. Review of attempts to amend the Con-
stitution under the "open-ended" provisions of the fourteenth amend-
ment imports a constitutional standard of representative democracy to
article V activity. Such review would allow the Court to sculpt a consti-
tutional law for the convention process that would insure that when
and if the Constitution is reconstructed by the American people under
article V's convention provision, the product of that reconstruction is
born of the representative, democratic process that the Constitution
promises. Perhaps the best way to insure the preservation of democratic
values in our culture is to insure that widespread, radical changes occur
democratically.
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